The new “Arrangement” between the European Commission and UEFA: A political capitulation of the EU

Posted on 08:18 - by Unknown In: , ,
Yesterday, the European Commission stunned the European Sports Law world when it announced unexpectedly that it had signed a “partnership agreement” with UEFA named (creatively): ‘The Arrangement for Cooperation between the European Commission and the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA)’. The press release indicates that this agreement is to “commit the two institutions to working together regularly in a tangible and constructive way on matters of shared interest”. The agreement was negotiated (as far as we know) secretly with UEFA. Despite recent meetings between EU Commissioner for sport Vassiliou and UEFA President Platini, the eventuality of such an outcome was never evoked. It is very unlikely that third-interested-parties (FIFPro, ECA, Supporters Direct etc.) were consulted in the process of drafting this Arrangement. This surprising move by an outgoing Commission will be analysed in a three-ponged approach. First, we will discuss the substance of the Arrangement (I). Thereafter, we will consider its potential legal value under EU law (II). Finally, and maybe more importantly, we will confront the political relevance of the agreement (III).  
The substance of the “Arrangement” between UEFA and the European Commission
What’s in the Arrangement? In short, a lot of random considerations, very little concrete commitments, and an administrative structure for future dialogue.
The “basis” for the cooperation between UEFA and the European Commission is a mixed bag of shared concerns and common views. Both institutions are keen on strengthening their dialogue “in the interests of the long-term development and societal role of sport in general and football in particular” (Article 2.1. of the Arrangement), especially in the light of the societal value of sport (Article 2.2.) and the many challenges and risks it is facing (Article 2.3.). Therefore, they “endeavour to strengthen policies designed to encourage the local training and education of athletes” (Article 2.4.). The parties share the view that “appropriate solutions are to be found in order to ensure that athletes are available to play for their national teams” (Article 2.5.), but also that “redistribution mechanisms concerning, for example, audiovisual media revenues and training compensation fees should be recommended” (Article 2.6.). Furthermore, they acknowledge that “[F]inancial stability, transparency and better governance within sport can be pursued through responsible self-regulation”. For example, “measures to encourage greater rationality and discipline in club finances with a focus on the long-term as opposed to the short-term, such as Financial Fair Play initiative, contribute to the sustainable development and healthy growth of sport in Europe” (Article 2.7.).  
The parties also agree that the “health and human dignity of athletes must be protected from abusive and unethical practices”. In this regard, “[I]t is important that […] so-called third-party ownership of the “economic rights” of player, do not threaten the integrity of sporting competition or undermine the relationship of trust and mutual respect that should exist in any relationship of employment” (Article 2.8.). More broadly, the parties recognise the need for social dialogue, protecting fundamental rights, promoting gender equality and to fight all forms of racism, xenophobia, homophobia and discrimination (Article 2.9.). It is recognized that “[t]o improve good governance standards, UEFA can also play a prominent role in seeking appropriate solutions on issues pertaining to players’ transfers and agents at European level” (Article 2.10.). Concerning match-fixing, the parties acknowledge that close cooperation is needed (2.11). 
The Arrangement calls for an “effective protection of intellectual property rights”, as their exploitation “represents an important source of income for professional football” (Article 2.12.). It also favours “the reinforcement of the Council of Europe convention on spectator violence” (Article 2.13.). In a very important holding, arbitration is recognised as “an important voluntary tool for settling disputes in sport and ensuring that sporting rules are applied, interpreted and enforced in an effective and uniform manner, while also ensuring respect of the applicable legal norms and procedural safeguards within and outside of the EU” (Article 2.14.). Finally, “the European Commission and UEFA will collaborate in the context of the planned European Week of Sport, using football to promote healthy physical activity” (Article 2.15).
This collection of, more or less, random thoughts collated in the Arrangement lead to two broad objectives: “to promote cooperation and strengthen relations between the European Commission and UEFA in the interests of the sustainable development of football” (Article 3.1.1.) and “to exchange information, knowledge and good-practice on matters of common interest” (Article 3.1.2). These objectives are to be implemented through a “policy dialogue” between the Secretary General of UEFA and the Director General responsible for Sport in the EC (Article 4.1, 4.2, 4.4, & 4,5). The implementation will also involve “Regular and ad hoc meetings […] between officials of the Sides […]” (Article 4.3.).
The Arrangement will start on the date of the signature [14 October 2014] and is to last until 31 December 2017 (Article 5.1.). The Sides to the Arrangement are free to amend it (Article 5.2). While, each side “can, at any time discontinue the application of this Arrangement, but should endeavour to provide a three-month notice of such discontinuation to the other Side” (Article 5.3.). Finally, both sides acknowledge that the “Arrangement does not create rights or obligations under international, EU or domestic law” (Article 5.4.).   

The legal value of the “Arrangement” under EU law
This is not a memorandum of understanding, a gentleman’s agreement between UEFA and the Commission, or a simple political declaration; this Arrangement is formally approved by a binding decision of the European Commission, to which it is attached. This decision could not be based on Article 165 paragraph 4 of the TFEU (the sports legal basis), as it does not confer to the European Commission the power to adopt such a decision. Hence, the Commission needed to rely on its general competence derived from Article 17 TEU.[1] Already, this is cause for legal concern; for example one could question the legitimacy of the circumvention of the limits set expressively in Article 165 TFEU and the recourse to Article 17 TEU to stretch the Commission’s competences. Ultimately, it could lead to a legal challenge against the decision, based on the European Commission’s lack of competence to adopt it. In any way, this is unlikely to happen, as it would require an EU Institution (the Council or the European Parliament), or a Member State to do so. 
What does the fact that the Arrangement is enshrined in a European Commission decision mean in legal terms? As specified in Article 288 TFEU: “A decision shall be binding in its entirety”. This is a legally binding document, in theory reviewable by Courts and potentially capable of generating rights and legitimate expectations for a third party (most probably UEFA). The Commission was apparently very weary of dodging this possibility. Therefore, it kept the wording of its commitments relatively vague and introduced many references to the primacy of EU Competition law and the EU acquis in the text. Moreover, article 5.4 of the Arrangement stipulates that it “does not create rights or obligations under international, EU or domestic law”. This makes it very difficult to envisage a possibility for UEFA to claim that it has concrete legitimate expectations arising from this Arrangement.[2] Consequently, in practice, this Arrangement is very much a soft legal instrument in the guise of hard law administrative decision. Nevertheless, the law is not always only about the law and such soft legal documents might have hard political and legal consequences. 

The hard political (and legal) reality of a soft legal “Arrangement”
The legal theoretical debate over the nature and function of soft law instruments has been on-going for more than 20 years now.[3] But, one thing seems to be more or less certain, soft legal mechanisms matter.[4] They matter politically, as they shape the perception of public opinion and play a role in public discourse. Sometimes they might also matter legally, especially when legal standards based on the substantial balancing of values (or risks) are used, as for example the proportionality principle. Therefore, the European Commission should be very weary of using such soft instruments in a blunt fashion. 
In our view, this Arrangement between UEFA and the European Commission is a misguided soft law instrument. Indeed, despite its willingness not to get into an agreement creating legal rights for UEFA, the European Commission will be haunted (politically and legally) by it for the years to come. For example, it will be very difficult for the European Commission to consider that UEFA’s Financial Fair Play regulations are disproportionate in the sense of the Meca-Medina test, after recognizing that it contributes to “the sustainable development and healthy growth of sport in Europe”. The Commission also adds that this recognition is “subject to compliance with competition law”. Thus, it remains in theory possible for the DG Competition to consider FFP incompatible with EU Competition law. However, one need not be a political wizard to understand the difficulty to do so after having enshrined such a statement in an official decision (UEFA is already claiming that the Commission “fully supports” the “implementation of Financial Fair Play”). UEFA would easily point at the obvious contradiction and the European public would rightly blame the European Commission for its inconsistency.                                                                                            
Unfortunately, this Arrangement is not only about UEFA’s FFP regulations; instead, the European Commission is signing on a set of very controversial statements. Indeed, by qualifying sporting Arbitration as “an important voluntary tool for settling disputes in sport” and “ensuring respect of the applicable legal norms and procedural safeguards within and outside of the EU” it indirectly recognizes the legitimacy of the Court of Arbitration for Sport. This is notwithstanding the very acute doubts about the “voluntary” nature of this arbitration[5], as well as potential concerns related to its independence. In this context, one can only be perplexed by the willingness of the European Commission to throw caution to the wind. The CAS might be a useful tool for sports governing bodies trying to evade the purview of national courts; it might even be necessary to avoid the fragmentation of the global anti-doping regime or to offer a quick and clean dispute resolution mechanisms in certain disciplinary or commercial cases. However, its legitimacy and its capacity to safeguard the fundamental rights of athletes is not a given and the European Commission would have been well advised to show considerable restraint in weighing in on this question. This lack of caution is generally true for other very complex socio-economic issues tackled en passant in the Arrangement, and in which UEFA had a keen (economic) interest to defend: the release of players for the national teams, the intellectual property rights over football and the regulation of the transfer system. 
Finally, UEFA will now enjoy privileged access to the highest level of the EU’s executive branch. This is akin to an ‘all you can eat’ lobbying ticket to defend its interests and views. UEFA may have a central function in the organization of European football, but, it is not the UN, States have no say in its policies, nor have the people which are directly affected by them.[6] There is no good reason to confer a special political status to UEFA, especially taking into account that, as a private government, it refuses to give a real institutional voice to some of its most prominent “citizens”: the players, the clubs or the fans. By doing so, the Commission risks cutting itself from the other legitimate voices of football and losing sights of its duty to defend the European general interest as a whole. 
Did the outgoing European Commission rush to cash-in on a visual accolade from Michel Platini? One is left to wonder. For all these substantial political concessions, the European Commission won only the meagre promise that “UEFA will collaborate in the context of the planned European Week of Sport, using football to promote healthy physical activity”. Such an Arrangement could have potentially made sense, if the European Commission would have imposed in return certain governance standards on UEFA (real stakeholders participation, transparency requirements etc…), or conditioned its signature to the full implementation of the recently agreed (and not even mentioned in the Arrangement) European social dialogue agreement for professional football players. 
In short, with this Arrangement the European Commission capitulated politically in front of UEFA. Such a capitulation need not take a legally binding form; its political meaning is enough. It is a sad day for European Sports Law and for those keen on democratizing the governance of football and on subjecting it to the rule of law. One can only hope that, as it has done in the past, the Court of Justice will be willing to supplant the Commission in defending the European general interest and the rights of athletes.

[1] Article 17(1) TEU reads as follows: “The Commission shall promote the general interest of the Union and take appropriate initiatives to that end. It shall ensure the application of the Treaties, and of measures adopted by the institutions pursuant to them. It shall oversee the application of Union law under the control of the Court of Justice of the European Union. It shall execute the budget and manage programmes. It shall exercise coordinating, executive and management functions, as laid down in the Treaties. With the exception of the common foreign and security policy, and other cases provided for in the Treaties, it shall ensure the Union's external representation. It shall initiate the Union's annual and multiannual programming with a view to achieving interinstitutional agreements.”
[2] On the scope of the notion of « Legitimate expectations » in EU administrative Law, see P. Craig, EU Administrative Law, OUP, 2012, pp. 567-570
[3] For an early discussion of soft law in the framework of EU law see : F. Snyder, ‘The effectiveness of European Community Law : Institutions, Processes, Tools and Techniques’, Modern Law Review, vol.56, 1993, 19-56, p.32-35
[4] L. Senden, Soft law in European Community Law, Hart Publishing, 2004 ; O. Stefan, Soft Law in Court : Competition Law, State Aid and the Court of Justice of the EU, Kluwer, 2013.
[5] The recent Pechstein decision by the Landgericht München highlighted this lack of consent from the part of the athlete.
[6] On the need to distinguish between its factual capacity to create legal rules and its legitimacy to do so, see A. Duval, ‘Lex Sportiva.

Analysis of Goal Scoring Patterns in the 2012 European Football Championship

Posted on 08:16 - by Unknown In: , , , , , ,
ABSTRACT
Purpose: The aim of the present study was to investigate the factors associated with goal scoring in top class football matches. Methods: 76 goals analyzed from 31 matches from the European football Championship in Poland-Ukraine in 2012. The SportScout performance analysis tool was used to time code when goal scored and the associated behaviors relating to goal scoring. Results: It was presented that 57.9 % of the goals were scored in the second half and most of them in the last 15-min period, while the first goal seems to play an important role in the final result of the match. Most goals were scored during open play (72.4%) but 27.6% scored after a set play, mainly following corner kick and free kick. Concerning initiation zone of the attack, it was presented that 56.6% began from the attacking half. Most goals were scored after a cross (43.7%) while regarding goal scoring area, over 90% of goals were scored inside the penalty area and specifically from the area between penalty spot and goal zone (42.1%). Finally, almost ½ of goals were scored without any pressure from defenders. Conclusions: The present study presented guidelines to coaches in order to design trainings similar to the actual competition and adapt the game style with regard to match status. Moreover, coaches can use this information to establish objectives for players and teams with a special reference to the offensive or defensive play.
INTRODUCTION
Match analysis is the objective recording and examination of behavioural events that occur during competition (12). The main aim of match analysis is to identify strengths of one’s own team, which can then be further developed, and its weaknesses, which suggest areas for improvement. Similarly, a coach analyzing the performance of an opposition side will use the data to identify ways to counter that team’s strengths and exploit its weaknesses (11). A performance indicator has been described as a selection, or combination, of action variables that aims to define some or all aspects of a performance (19). These indicators constitute an ideal profile that should be present in the athletic activity to achieve success and can be used as a way to predict the future behaviour of sporting activity (27).
However, what might be classified as a good performance in football, such as a high proportion of possession, a higher number of goal-scoring opportunities, shots on target or corners, does not always relate to success. A football team can be successful and win a game or competition, despite performing suboptimal (50). At all competitive levels, the main concern is simply to score at least one more goal than the opponent while in some tournament settings, goal differential may influence attacking philosophy. A single goal can change radically, and for a considerable amount of time, the strategic environment in which teams interact (38). Consequently, the most identified components of the performance in football matches are the scored goals. An analysis of how goals are scored can reveal critical factors that will help determine the most appropriate attacking strategy, briefly to obtain winning formula.
Since the landmark work of Reep and Benjamin (42), many studies have focused on goal scoring patterns in various national and international football tournaments. Reep and Benjamin (42) showed that approximately 80% of goals scored were the result of a short sequence of three or less passes and that 1 in 10 shots tend to lead to a goal. More recently, Hughes and Franks (21) showed that in the 1990 and 1994 World Cup tournaments 84% and 80% of goals respectively came from possessions of four or less passes. In addition, 80% and 77% of the shots at goal were a result of a sequence of four or less passes.
Jinshan and co-workers (25) reported on the characteristics of goals from the 14th World Cup and showed that nearly 70% of all goals were scored in the 2nd half. Armatas, Yiannakos and Sileloglou (6) studied three World Cups (1998, 2002 and 2006) and reported that more goals were scored as time progresses, however lower percentages than Jishan et al. (25). Moreover, many studies have pointed out the influence in the final score of an early goal or the first goal in a match (3, 26, 37, 51).
Bangsbo and Peitersen (7) point out the magnitude of set plays in modern football and reported that twenty are estimated to appear, in average, for each team in every match. Many studies from international and domestic tournaments have reported that about 25%-40% of all goals have been scored on set plays (3, 25, 30, 48, 49, 51).
Other research has examined the position on the pitch from which goals are scored. In a recent study Wright et al. (50) showed that from 167 goals from English Premier League, 87% of goals were scored inside the penalty area which is similar to the 90% observed by Olsen (36) for the 1986 World Cup whereas Dufour (14) reported 80% for the 1990 World Cup. Yiannakos and Armatas (51) reported that 44.4% of goals scored were inside the penalty area, 35.2% inside the goal area, and 20.4% outside the penalty area, for the 2004 European Championship in Portugal. Finally, Hughes et al. (22) showed that successful teams in the 1986 Football World Cup made more attempts inside the penalty area in comparison to unsuccessful teams.
Usually, after international tournaments, such as the European Championship, successful teams set new trends in terms of playing style and training. Indeed, others will tend to imitate the tactics and play of winning teams, seeking to master those aspects of performance which are deemed to underlie their success (21). The European Football Championship provides an opportunity to examine the best teams and players in Europe. Thus the purpose of the present study was to analyze the goals scored in the European Championship in Poland-Ukraine in 2012.
METHODS
Footage from all matches from the 2012 European Championship was obtained via recording into AVI format of the television coverage, so it was compatible with the multisport notational analysis system (SportScout) that was used. In all, there were 2 goalless matches leaving 29 matches with 76 goals. One own goal was excluded from the study. A SportScout coding template was created to allow necessary information to be drawn from the footage by two experienced coders. All the output data was exported from SportScout into an excel data base for subsequent data analysis.
The following performance indicators were analyzed:
a) Time of goal scored (0-15, 16-30, 31-45+, 46-60, 61-75, 76-90+, 1st extra time, 2nd extra time)
b) Influence in the final score of the first goal (Win, Draw, Loss)
c) Type of play (Open play, Set play)
d) Style of play (Positional play, Direct play, Counter attack)
e) Type of set play (Free kick, Corner, Penalty, Throw in)
f) Initiation zone of the attack (pitch zones)
g) Number of passes leading up to goal (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8+)
h) Type of feed prior to goal scored (Pass<10m, Pass 10-20m, Cross, Shot, Individual action)
i) Scoring area (pitch zones)
j) Actions leading up to goal (One touch, Control+shot, Control+dribble+shot)
k) Shot type (Instep shot, Inside of the foot, Header, Other)
l) Existence of pressure by defenders on scorer (Pressure, No pressure)
m) Scorer’s playing position (Striker, Winger, Midfielder, Defender)
n) Goal zone (a1, a2, a3, b1, b2, b3, c1, c2, c3)
Statistical Analysis
Firstly, a descriptive analysis of the data was done (frequency, average, standard deviation). Then, to compare distribution frequency between independent variables chi-square tests were used, while one-way repeated measures ANOVA and t-test were used to compare average. The inter-rater reliability of separate observations was calculated to guarantee the quality of the observation system. A reliability index of 0.96 was observed (intra-class correlation coefficient and kappa index). SPSS 18 was used for data analysis (Lead Technologies Inc, USA) and the level of significance was set at p < 0.05. Results
Altogether 76 goals from 31 matches were analyzed which is on average 2.62±1.42 per match. Only in two of these matches no goals were scored. At Euro 2012, 57.9% of the goals were scored in the second half and 21.1% of them in the last 15-min period as shown in Table 1. However, there was not significant difference between the first and second half of the match (F(1, 75) =1.918, p = .170) as well as ANOVA did not show that frequency of goals scored were time dependent (F (5, 71) =1.065, p= .387). As expected, results presented that the first goal is critically important to match outcome. Moreover, of the teams that scored first results showed that they won 75.9%, lost 6.9% and had drawn 17.2% of the matches (x2(2, 29) =24.069, p<0.001).
Most goals (72.4%) were scored during open play (x2(1,76) =15.211, p<0.001), mainly following positional play while the rest of them were scored after a set play (27.6%), mainly following corner kicks and free kicks, as shown in Figure 1. Concerning initiation zone of the attack, it was presented that 56.6% of goals began from the attacking half, 43.4% from the defending half, while 52.6% goals began from central zone of the pitch. No differences were found between right and left zone, where in each zone 23.7% of goals were scored (Figure 2). Table 2 illustrates the sequence length of ball possessions that resulted in goal, where 61.84% of goals came from team possessions of four passes or less. On the other hand, a sizeable amount of goals were also preceded by passing sequence eight or more, which represented roughly 20% of them.
Regarding the type of feed, most goals were scored after a cross (43.7%) or a short pass (35.2%) which were significant differently ((x2(4,71) =46.535, p<0.001) compared to feed from pass 10-20m (4.2%), shot (7.0%) and individual action (9.9%). Moreover, results presented that after the final pass, the scorer finished in most cases with one touch (63.7%) which was statistically different (x2(2,71) =28.930, p<0.001), secondly after controling the ball (19.7%) and finally after controling and dribbling before shooting (16.9%). Figure 3 shows the pitch zones from which goals were scored, where over 90% of goals were scored inside the penalty area (F (1, 75) =149.224, p<0.001), (T (1, 25) =12.216, p<0.001) and specifically from the area between penalty spot and goal zone (42.1%). Concerning the way that the goals were scored from the player, it was shown that instep shots accounted for 38.67%, inside of the foot for 32.% and header for 29.33%, whereas almost ½ of the goals (47.2%) were scored without any pressure (x2(1,72) =0,222, p=0.637) from defending players.
As expected, most of the goals were scored from strikers (41.3%) and wingers (29.3%), whereas midfielders (20%) and defenders (9.3%) had diminished percentages. Finally, Figure 4 shows the goal zones where the goals were ended.  
DISCUSSION
The aim of the study was to investigate the factors associated with goal scoring patterns in football, taking into consideration a broader range of performance indicators. Firstly, it was presented that goals scored were not time dependent. Although no statistical difference was observed, more goals scored in the second half of the matches, while 15min period analysis revealed that more goals were scored in the beginning and in the end of the second half. Game period has been suggested as one of the factors that influence team performance (10) and the majority of papers in the literature are in agreement with the present study. In this way, Kirkendall and his colleagues (28) found that goals were most common at the start of the second half and the end of the game in World Cup 1998. Moreover, Abt, Dickson and Mummery (1) observed an upward trend in the number of goals scored as time progressed in 703 matches played during four seasons of the Australian National Soccer League. The highest percentage of goals was scored in the last 5-minute period of each half (41st-45th min. and 86th -90th min.). Armatas and Yiannakos (3) verified that in 2006 FIFA World Cup matches the greatest number of goals was scored between the 75th and 90th minutes, while Yiannakos and Armatas (51) in their study for Euro 2004 found that significant more of goals were scored in second half.
The results of the present study could be attributed in tactical and physiological factors. In a recent study, Pratas, Volossovitch and Ferreira (39), found that teams perform significantly fewer direct plays in the first half and make significantly more shots in the second half of Portuguese league matches. One reason could be that players consider rapid movements with the ball to involve risk and therefore attempt less such actions during the first half, when the match result is not yet decided (10). Additionally, Reilly (43) reports that play may become urgent towards the end of match as teams chase a result, thus players are more willing to take greater risks towards the end of a match in order to affect an outcome (1). It is also possible that the losing team pushes players forward in order to create scoring opportunities, thereby scoring themselves or conceding further goals (44).
Several studies have reported a decrease in physical performance in the second half of matches and explained that this is due to physical fatigue (8, 40). According to Mohr et al. (33), the time – motion analyses and performance measures during match-play, fatigue or reduced performance seem to occur at three different stages in the game: a) after short-term intense periods in both halves; b) in the initial phase of the second half; and c) towards the end of the game. Moreover, it has been observed that the amount of high-intensity running is reduced in the final 15 min of a top-class football match (32) and that jumping, sprinting, and intermittent exercise performance is lowered after versus before a football match (33).
Preparing for a team to last for 90 minutes does not reduce the need to be alert right from the kickoff. It is a terrible setback to concede a goal in the first minute and, of course, extreme boost for the scoring team. The results of the present study highlighted the significance of the first goal to the match outcome; it was shown that when a team scored first, it won 75.9% of the matches. In previous studies it was presented that teams which scored first went on to win 73.5% in 1994 World Cup tournament, 59.4% of the matches where there was a winner in 2002 World Cup (34) and 73.21% in 2002 World Cup 2006 (3).
Research on psychological momentum agrees with the present results. Moreover, it has shown that early success in a competition (e.g. scoring first) is a strong predictor of outcome in football (26, 37). Performance after the first goal is controlled by two responses: firstly how well the team which scores the first goal retains its advantage and secondly how well the team which concedes the first goal counters its disadvantage (35).
Thus when leading, it is important to keep pressing for more. In training, therefore, a coach should subject a team to a situation of playing while in the lead so the players develop the mental strength that is needed to sustain a lead. This can be done through simulated handicapped play, where a team starts a game knowing that they are either ahead by one or trailing by one or two goals. This will enable the coach to assess the reaction of the players in the different situations (35).
In relation to type of play, most goals scored after open play (72.4%) and almost 1/3 after set plays (27.6%). This coincides with the results of James, Mellalieu and Taylor (23), Lago and Martin (30) and Taylor, James and Mellalieu (48) who showed that about 25%-40% of all goals have been scored on set plays. Our findings provide further evidence for the importance of practicing set plays because of their potential productivity, despite their relatively low occurrence in comparison to open play opportunities. Concerning the style of play that was used to score a goal, the majority of goals were scored after positional attacks (60%) but significant percentage was scored after counter attack (20%) and direct play (20%).
In a recent study, that examined the goal scoring patterns in Euro 2004 presented similar results (positional attacks: 44.1%, counter attacks: 20.3%, set plays: 35.6%) (51). Also, according to Dufour (14) 88% of the goals in the World Cup Tournament in 1990 came from an organized offense and 12% from a counter-attack. A more recent study (4) found that despite the fact that frequency of counter-attacks in modern football is low (4.9%), they are considered to be more effective than organized offense moves; the following percentages are indicative and support such a proposition: 16.9% of counter-attacks lead to a goal whereas only 11.1% of positional attacks are successful.
Concerning the set play’s effectiveness, the data collected in present study are similar to those found by other authors and allow us to assert that corner kick (47.6%) and free kick (33.3%) are the plays that are performed on set pieces which result in the highest number of goals. Thus, free kicks and corner kicks have been shown to be the greatest source of goals, producing 46% and 13% of goals respectively at the 1994 World Cup (46) and 50% and 47.6% at the 1998 competition (15) and 33.3% and 26.7% at the 2006 competition (5).
Regarding the initiation zone of the attack, it was presented that most goals began from the attacking half while no differences were found between right and left zone. Jankovic and his colleagues (24) studied Euro 2008 and presented that 28.8%, 38.3% and 31.2% of goals initiated from the defensive third, middle third and attacking third respectively. Moreover, recent studies presented that in the 5 minutes before a goal was scored, the scoring team had significantly more possession in the middle and attacking thirds compared to the half average (41, 45). The authors suggested a definite shift and territorial advantage for the team about to score in the 5 minutes leading to the goal.
Some studies (9, 42) showed that goals occur when teams played with direct method. Particularly, Reep, and Benjamin (42) found that approximately 80% of goals resulted from a sequence of three passes or less. Moreover, Hook and Hughes (17) found that successful teams utilized longer possessions than unsuccessful teams in Euro 2000, although no significant differences were found in the number of passes used in attacks leading to a goal. These authors suggested that keeping the ball for longer durations was indicative of success. However, in a similar study, Stanhope (47) found that time in possession of the ball was not indicative of success in the 1994 World Cup. Jones, et al. (27) showed that successful teams in the English Premier league typically had longer possessions than unsuccessful teams, irrespective of the match status (evolving score). The results of the present study indicated that most goals (61.84%) resulted from a sequence of four passes or less; however 20% of goals resulted from a passing sequence of eight or more. Consequently, with the evolution of football, other styles of play have emerged, with more sequence of passes before the shot, i.e., teams try to find the best moment to attack with efficacy, maintaining the ball and the control of the game, waiting for the mistake or equilibrium break of the opponent (13). Therefore, there is probably not a principle that determines that ball possessions with few or many passes provide more or less shots to goal, once both ways can create kicks or headers conditions, depending on the match situations.
As proposed from previous resources (3, 50, 51), our findings showed that most goals were scored when the type of feed was from a cross (43.7%). Griffiths (16) found that France, who was at that time considered the best international team in the World, created significantly more crosses than their opponents, while Lago et al. (29) proposed that crosses is one of the variables that better differentiate winning, losing and drawing teams in a global way. Theis (49) supported that wing offensive play with long passes is a primary offensive tactic in order to face defending deep. Often, defenders used to commit errors in such cases because they observe the player that has the possession of the ball and not the unmarked players. Therefore, training should focus on improving long passes inside penalty area, preparing players to have the ability to score goals after an air ball but also defend better it such situations (3).
The results of the present study supported previous findings that more than 90% of goals were scored from within the penalty area. The current value is similar to the 90% observed by Olsen (36) for the 1986 World Cup, 87% by Wright and his colleagues (50) for English Premier League and 83.4% by Armatas and Yiannakos (3) for the 2006 World Cup. Moreover, it was presented that there seems to be an ‘effective’ area inside the penalty from which 42.1% goals scored. Hughes and Franks (20) have previously identified the key objective of getting the ball into a ‘prime target area’, which was defined as the area that consists of the length of the six-yard box and is from the penalty spot to within two yards inside the six-yard box. Hughes (18) stated that about four goals in every five scored from crosses are hit from this area, while Carling et al. (12) found that 37% were scored from the same area in the 2002 World Cup. The increased rate of recurrence of offensive actions and effectiveness inside the penalty area is justified by the fact that this area is nearer to goalpost and outside of the goalkeeper’s reaches (31). Thus, training should be focused on drills that contain shots inside the penalty area under match conditions but also on defensive response from defenders and goalkeeper.
With relation to the goal scorer, we found that 41.3% and 29.3% of goals were scored by strikers and wingers respectively. In a recent study, Acar and his colleagues (2) concluded that forward players scored 57% of goals in the 2006 World Cup while Mitrotasios and colleagues (31) studied Greek SuperLeague and concluded that strikers scored 47.7% of goals. In the present study, strikers and wingers were discriminated because of the massive usage of the wings due to systems of play with winger players (1-4-2-3-1 and 1-4-3-3). Moreover, in most cases the player scored the goal with one touch (63.7%) and almost ½ of the goals were scored without any pressure from defenders, however the above results could not be comparable because of the lack in literature.
CONCLUSIONS
The main objective of this study was to analyze the performance parameters of the most successful teams in Europe which competed in the final tournament of the European Championship in 2012, in order to give clues for specific tactical issues and training guidelines that coaches and competitive players need to carry out to be successful. The results demonstrate that top European teams score 1/4 of goals after set plays, initiate attacks from offensive half and there is not a principle that determines that ball possessions with few or many passes provide more goals. Moreover, there seems to be a critical zone inside the penalty area from which most goals are scored, crosses identified as a relevant factor for team goals and almost ½ of the goals were scored without any pressure from defenders.
APPLICATIONS IN SPORT
The present study presented values that can be used as normative data to design and evaluate practices and matches for football performance in a collective way. Likewise, it will allow coaches to design training exercises similar to the actual competition and adapt the game style with regard to match status. Moreover, coaches can use this information to establish objectives for players and teams. These objectives can be oriented in a positive way (things or number of things to try to achieve) or in a negative way (things or number of things to try to avoid) with a special reference to the offensive or defensive play.
The limitation of the present study is that it is based on one specific championship (2012 European football championship). The need for constant record and evaluation of football characteristics is prevalent, since it presents continuous evolvement; thus further research concerning goal analysis should include different competitions that involve other contextual factors (game location in a balanced schedule, continental differences, match status, etc.).
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Is Financial Fair Play in European football any good?

Posted on 08:13 - by Unknown In: , , , ,
UEFA's Financial Fair Play-program (FFP) has received significant criticism. In a new paper, one of the architects behind FFP, Swiss professor Egon Franck, argues that the criticism is misguided.
It is a common characteristic of professional European football that it suffers from financial problems. Even the 'big five' leagues (England, Germany, France, Italy and Spain) face increasing debts and deficits. The clubs tend to overspend, and that has led UEFA to implement FFP, which aims at getting the clubs to live within their means.

Most recently, clubs like Manchester City and Paris Saint-Germain have been sanctioned for failing to meet the new regulations.

However, in the wake of the development and implementation of Financial Fair Play (FFP), several economists have criticised the regulation and questioned its potential.

Overall, there seems to exist three main strands of critique against the Financial Fair Play-program:
  • FFP hinders necessary capital injections to financially distressed clubs
  • FFP prevents competition in the player market and serves as a U.S. salary cap without improving competitive balance
  • FFP ‘freezes’ the existing club hierarchy and makes it impossible for small clubs to break the existing hierarchy.

The Swiss economist Egon Franck, who has advised UEFA in forming the principles behind the Financial Fair Play, disagrees with all three strands and argues that, contrary to what the critics say, FFP will benefit European Football.

Does FFP hinder necessary capital injections to clubs?
The first point of critique of the FFP concerns the need for clubs to have money injected if they get into financial trouble. According to the critics, the clubs’ overspending is not a problem and the central rule that the clubs must break-even is therefore superfluous.

Critics say that intervention is unnecessary because clubs losing money is not a problem to outside society as long as creditors, rich owners or other stakeholders wish to spend their money supporting them.
According to Franck, the problem is, however, that clubs who continue to survive even serious economic problems start calculating with the fact that they can get away with spending more than their budgets allow. The European football clubs are in general too big to fail, which means that they expect to be bailed-out, should they fall short on capital.
This means that instead of taking hard managerial decisions regarding the football product, the clubs are busy pleasing sugar daddies and other club creditors.
Based on the soft budget constraints theory developed by the Hungarian economist Jànos Kornais, Franck argues that, in the long run, this will make the problems of European Football worse.

Just as the Hungarian economy suffered from scarcity behind the Iron Curtain, due to state intervention that balanced inefficient public enterprises’ deficits, the football product may suffer from a lack of innovation and effective management, since the clubs will never have a real incentive to function within their abilities and ensure happy football consumers. As long as European football functions under a soft budget constraint, dead serious considerations regarding profits are not properly taken into consideration.
The demand for players will continue to rise, creating a cycle of over-investment, because the clubs can expect to get help if they cannot pay the bill. Management and good governance concerning the important development and operation of the football clubs will be of less importance than the extravagant spending.
According to Franck, this will never be for the good of neither European football nor the clubs themselves.  

Does FFP constrain a competition in the market for players?
The second strand of criticism is that the FFP constraints player salaries and is comparable to US major league salary-caps.

Assumed, as it is, salary-caps limits clubs' salary expenses and improves competitive balance. Combined with redistributive mechanisms in terms of spectator and television revenues, 'rookie drafts' etc. it creates a more even level of sporting competition between the U.S. teams.

In the open European leagues, however, such a tool would not affect the competitive balance, critics say - including the English sports economist Stefan Szymanski. In general, they believe that it is inappropriate to restrict the clubs' ability to invest (overspending and building debt) because this is the way business works.

In reply to this, Franck argues that it makes no sense to say that free and unlimited (over-)spending on players and player salaries creates a better situation than ensuring that clubs do not actually spend more than they have.

How can letting go of the problems of over-spending improve the current situation, asks  Franck. Compared to the U.S. salary-caps, Franck sees the FFP rules as relatively soft, and even though the rules may not contribute to improved competitive balance, this was never the primary purpose of the program.
In a European context, Franck points to many other ways to ensure exciting matches, and the promotion and relegation system – which also ensures an opportunity to play other top teams via the European tournaments – is a way to maintain tension in the competitions. The clubs are continuously promoted and relegated based on their current level of competition.

If a club is relegated, its matches the following seasons will be more equal – and vice versa. 

Does FFP ‘freeze’ the existing hierarchy between the clubs?
The last of the main strands of criticism is an argument that FFP will 'freeze' the existing hierarchy between the clubs because smaller clubs are unable to gamble to the same extent or invest at the same level as today’s big clubs have been capable to .

This puts the established clubs in a favorable position because they have already made the investments that the smaller clubs are now prevented from making. Some researchers have pointed out that this may even conflict with EU competition law.

This point is also rejected by Egon Franck. He says that the argument of a frozen hierarchy seems to rest on the assumption that the only way that smaller clubs can compete is by significantly overspending while hoping for an economic rescue.

In his opinion, this is not only an untenable situation at the outset, but the argument does not stand because according to Franck, FFP only limits ‘inflated’ contracts, meaning what can be defined as ‘over-price’-deals with willing owners or patrons.

In theory, there is no maximum to the amount of money poured into the clubs as long as it reflects a fair market value transaction between a club and an extern party. The only difference is that the deal must be completed in a regular manner and not work as a financial rescue. According to Franck, this restriction will have favorable effects on incentive structures as well as club management.
The end of the 'zombie race'
Generally, Egon Franck rejects that smaller clubs should have better chances of competing if FFP was abandoned.
According to the Swiss professor, sugar daddies will (continue to) seek towards clubs that are already big, because these clubs – ceteris paribus – have a better chance of maintaining or expanding their success. If FFP does not regulate capital injections, this becomes a self-reinforcing effect, where the big get bigger. In other words, the exact opposite effect than what critics argue that FFP will entail.
FFP will essentially force clubs to focus more on better management rather than merely following the logic of the big wallets. It will change the 'zombie race', that the sporting arms race between the clubs has turned into: Technically insolvent clubs that infect each other with poor financial management because everyone is trying to keep up with the upward wage spiral, while hoping for bailout by public or private actors when unsuccessful.

Contrary to what critics suggest, a positive side effect of FFP is financially healthy clubs that are run within their means, and on the basis of their real self-created market potential, says Franck.

This will not only create a better industry, but may even strengthen the competition on the market, instead of the current situation where the deepest pockets decide the game.

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